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We examine a problem for machine supported metatheory. There are
true statements about a theory that are true of some (but only some)
extensions; however, standard theory-structuring facilities do not support
selective inheritance. We use the example of the deduction theorem for
modal logic and show how a statement about a theory can explicitly for-
malize the closure conditions extensions should satisfy for it to remain
true. We show how metatheories based on inductive definitions allow
theories and general metatheorems to be organized this way and report
on a case study using the theory FS0 . ] 2000 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Hierarchical theory structuring plays an important role in the application of
theorem provers to nontrivial problems and many systems provide support for it.
For example, HOL [6], Isabelle [13], and their predecessor LCF [7] support
simple theory hierarchies. In these systems a theory is a specification of a language,
using types and typed constants, and a collection of rules and axioms which are
used to prove theorems; then a theory inherits the types, constants, axioms, rules,
and theorems from its ancestors. The drawback to this is that types associated with
the language and proof system must be considered open, and this limits the sort of
proofs that can be constructed. In particular, it rules out arguments requiring
induction on the structure of the language or proofs of a theory. We can close the
language or proof system by explicitly adding induction over the structure of the
language or proof system, but then it is unsound later to add new constructors,
axioms, or rules; i.e., extensions to the theory are impossible.
We investigate this problem and show that the simple hierarchical approach
described above, which in effect offers an all or nothing approach to inheriting
results, does not allow a fine enough control over the scope of theorems and is
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more inflexible than need be. Our solution uses a theory of parameterized inductive
definitions as a metatheory in which we can organize collections of object theories
and logics. This allows the same sort of hierarchical structuring as we have
described above, but also allows us to state and prove more general metatheoretic
results in a way such that they can be inherited by extensions, or supertheories, in
the hierarchy: instead of closing the theory for which we prove a result, we for-
malize, as part of the metatheorem itself, the closure properties we need. This means
that a theory for which we prove metatheorems can still be extended, and
metatheorems can be imported into the supertheory simply by checking that the
closure conditions are satisfied.
Our approach makes few special demands of the metatheory: it requires only that
we are able to build families of sets using parameterized inductive definitions and
can reason about their elements by induction. We report on an implementation of
our ideas in FS0 , a framework theory for formal metatheory due to Feferman [5],
which satisfies these requirements. We have used FS0 because it was designed to
provide a simple, minimal theory of inductive definitions specifically for the pur-
poses of syntactic metatheory; if we can use inductive definitions to structure theory
development in FS0 , then similar results should be possible with stronger
metatheories such as type theory or formalizations of induction definitions in
higher-order logic or set-theory (see Section 4.2 for more on this). The definitions
and proofs presented here have all been machine checked in our implementation
of FS0 .
1.1. Motivation
The example we consider from formal metatheory is fundamental for hierarchies
of Hilbert systems. Hilbert systems are interesting because they are commonly
acknowledged to be the easiest kind of proof system about which to prove
theorems, but also the hardest in which to prove theorems. In practice, to prove
theorems with them we need a metatheorem, the deduction theorem, which allows,
essentially, natural deduction style proof under assumption. To prove the deduction
theorem we need induction over the structure of derivations in a theory. However,
as noted, if this theorem is to be used in theory extensions then we need a new
approach to structuring hierarchies of theories. We start by informally developing
a hierarchy of theories and considering the facilities needed.
At the root of our hierarchy is what we call arrow logic (minimal implicative
propositional logic), the formulae of which correspond to members of the set LA
of formulae built from the binary connective  (written infix, associating to the
right) and sentential constants. Theorems correspond to members of a second set,
TA, and are instances of the standard Hilbert axiom schemata
A  B  A (K)
and
(A  B)  (A  B  C)  (A  C) (S)
81METATHEORY ON INDUCTIVE DEFINITIONS
or are generated by applying the rule modus ponens:
A A  B
B
.
We write |&A to indicate that A # TA. Then, assuming our (not yet formally
specified) metatheory contains at least the implies connective O , two meta-
theorems we can prove are:
|&A A  A (I)
( |&A A  C) O ( |&A A  B  C). (Thin)
The first of these asserts the provability of a formula in the object logic and the
second represents a derived proof rule. Given universal quantification over LA in
the metatheory, we could make both of the above formulae schematic by taking
their universal closures. (In the future we will assume this reading, leaving the
quantifiers implicit.)
Now consider the deduction theorem. For this we need to extend our meta-
language: we define A |&A B as metanotation meaning that if the Hilbert system TA
is extended with the additional axiom A, then B belongs to the resulting set of
proofs.1 The deduction theorem is, then,
A |&A B O |&A A  B , (DT)
which is proven by induction on the structure of derivations. Notice that just to
state this metatheorem, which is schematic in A (and B), we refer to infinitely many
axiomatic extensions of the original Hilbert system.
An obvious candidate for a supertheory of arrow logic is full propositional logic
(we consider here only conjunction, other operators are similar): we extend LA to
LP by adding the new binary connective 7 , and extend TA to TP by adding the
three new axiom schemata:
A  B  A 7 B
A 7 B  A (Conj)
A 7 B  B
What is the status of the theorems and metatheorems of arrow logic in proposi-
tional logic? We expect that all theorems, e.g., (I), are still theorems of proposi-
tional logic, provided that the original axioms (S) and (K) and inference rule
(modus ponens) are interpreted over the new language. The rule (Thin) clearly also
holds. The status of the deduction theorem is less obvious. In fact it does hold for
propositional logic, but since the proof suggested above is by induction on the
structure of arrow logic proofs, it is not valid in this new context; we must check
the new cases corresponding to the new axioms. If we used a metatheory based on
a logic like higher-order logic and formulated these two proof systems as standard
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1 Note that this is metanotation, since LA is a language of formulae, not sequents.
inductive definitions, we would need to prove the deduction theorem individually
for each system.
Now consider a second extension to a fragment of the normal propositional
modal logic K. Extend the language LA to LM by adding the unary modality g
and extend TA to TM by adding an axiom stating the distributivity of g over  ,
g(A  B)  (gA  gB) , (Norm)
and a rule of inference necessitation:
A
gA
. (Nec)
Again we can ask, what is the status of the theorems and metatheorems of arrow
logic in TM? Both (I) and (Thin) hold in any extension of TA with new axioms.
They even hold when TA is extended with new rules and also when the language
of LA is extended to LM , provided the old axioms and inference rule modus ponens
are interpreted over the new language. The deduction theorem (DT) also holds
under extensions of TA with new axioms. But it does not hold under extensions
with arbitrary new rules; in particular, it fails for TM with the additional rule (Nec).
We will later see, however, that instances of it hold in some extensions, provided
that certain conditions are satisfied.
To structure theories so that we can use metatheorems in appropriate extensions
we have to be able to formalize the above kinds of provisos and prove
metatheorems under them. We show that this is possible using parameterized
inductive definitions. Informally, an inductive definition of a set is presented as the
closure of some base set under a collection of rules that generate new elements from
members of the set. Formally, we will explain and use notation for inductive defini-
tions based on their presentation in FS0 . However, ignoring minor differences,
other formalizations are fairly similar (an example is provided in Section 4.2).
In FS0 an inductive definition corresponds to a term I(base, step) where base and
step are sets that formalize the base and step cases of the definition. The definition
defines a new set, which we can quantify over and reason about by induction. The
language and proof system of a theory each correspond to such a definition. For
example, for LA the set baseLA defines the sentential constants while stepLA explains
how two formulae in LA can be combined under a connective  . For TA the set
baseTA defines all instances of the axioms (S) and (K), while stepTA corresponds to
modus ponens.
Theory structuring is supported by our use of parameterized inductive defini-
tions, which are definitions where the base and step sets are augmented with
parameters specifying concrete or hypothetical extensions. For example, let
|&A[1, 2] A denote that the formula A belongs to the set I(baseTA _ 1, stepTA _ 2).
Here, the axioms of TA are extended by the set of axioms 1, and the rules of TA
are extended by the set of rules 2. The deduction theorem can now be formulated as
|&A[[A], <] B O |&A[<, <] A  B . (DT2)
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This metatheorem relates the provability of A  B in the theory TA to the
provability of B in the concrete extension of TA with the axiom A. In general, the
provisos on, and scope of, metatheorems can be formalized in terms of constraints
on parameter sets; i.e., we state a metatheorem for I(base _ 1, step _ 2) rather than
I(base, step) and then place conditions on 1 and 2. If 1 and 2 are empty, then we
get the metatheorem for the original theory. Thus, for instance, (I) and (Thin) hold
for extensions of the proof system baseTA and stepTA with arbitrary 1 and 2,
whereas we shall see that the deduction theorem holds only for arbitrary 1.
1.2. Organization
In Section 2 we provide more details about inductive definitions in FS0 and show
in Section 3 how we use them to implement the kind of metatheoretic development
described above, where metatheorems and their scope can be appropriately
parameterized. In Section 4 we report on practical experience using FS0 and the
possibility of using alternative metatheories such as inductive definitions within
higher-order logic. Finally, in Section 5 we relate our approach to formalizing
metatheorems to standard metatheory where rules are sometimes classified as
admissible or derived; our approach allows us to formalize other kinds of rules use-
ful for machine supported theorem proving and go beyond what is possible in
theorem provers like Isabelle or the HOL system where theories are hierarchically
structured. We also make comparisons with other approaches to structuring
theories that are not based on inductive definitions.
2. INDUCTIVE DEFINITIONS AND THE THEORY FS0
We use Feferman’s FS0 for our work since it is a particularly simple minimal
theory of inductive definitions. Moreover, we have built an implementation for it in
which we have tested our ideas. However since we do not give concrete FS0 proofs
in this paper and because our approach is not FS0 specific, we review only those
aspects that are relevant to this paper and are necessary to provide a rigorous
account of our approach. A full description of FS0 and our implementation can be
found in [5] and [10].
FS0 is a first-order theory of inductively defined sets. Elements of sets are
S-expressions, which are terms generated from the constant nil and the pairing
operation cons, usually written simply as a pair ( } , } ), where the comma associates
to the right; i.e., (a, b, c) is short for (a, (b, c)). Sets of S-expressions can be defined
by induction: if a and b are sets, then I(a, b) is the least set containing a and closed
under a rule
t1 t2
t
,
where (t, t1 , t2) # b. Note that we are allowed only inductive definitions with exactly
two predecessors, but this is sufficient for the needs of this paper (in fact it is
enough for general finitary definitions).
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We reason about inductively defined sets using the induction principle
base/s O \a, b, c. (b, c # s O (a, b, c) # step
O a # s) O I(base, step)/s .
Hence a predicate with extension s holds of a set I(base, step) if the predicate holds
of all elements in base and whenever it holds for two elements b and c, and (a, b, c)
is an instance of the rule step, then it also holds for a; i.e., the predicate is invariant
for rule application.
To get off the ground, FS0 provides ways of defining noninductive sets; it also
allows comprehension over a large class of first-order (essentially 701) predicates.
We write
x # s  P(x)
to indicate a set defined this way. Such definitions can be parameterized and the
parameters are treated in a simple way:
x # s(a, b)  (x, a) # b
defines a set s parameterized over an element a and a set b.
All definitions and theorems given in this paper have been checked using our
implementation of FS0 . For the sake of readability, however, we use standard
mathematical syntax (instead of the concrete ASCII syntax supported by our
implementation) in our presentation here.
3. STRUCTURED METATHEORY
We now formalize the hierarchy of propositional Hilbert systems given in the
Introduction. We begin by showing how inductive definitions can be made in an
open way which allows us to specify that a theorem holds in all extensions of the
language and proof system. Then we show how more control over the scope of a
metatheorem is possible and how this allows new and useful kinds of
metatheorems, like parameterized versions of the deduction theorem, which hold in
some, but not all extensions.
3.1. Arrow Logic
We begin by defining the language LA and proof system TA. LA is the smallest
set built from some atomic set of atoms and closed under the binary connective  .
Definition 1 (LA). First we define a constant ‘‘  ,’’ which we use to mark
syntactic objects. Then we define
x # imprule  _a, b. x=(a  b, a, b)
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at which point we could define LA #I(P, imprule), where P is a set of proposi-
tions. However, we make a more general definition, parameterized over arbitrary
base case, 1, and step case, 2, extensions:
LA[1, 2]#I(1, 2 _ imprule).
The language LA is then simply LA[P, <], where P is some class of atomic
propositions, and we can show, e.g., that a  a # LA [P, 2] given that a # P. Note
that  should not be confused with implication in the metalogic, O . Also, we will
write both implications with formulae associating to the right.
In the same way, we can declare the family of proof systems TA :
Definition 2 (TA). Let
x # K  _a, b # LA . x=a  b  a
x # S  _a, b, c # LA . x=(a  b)  (a  b  c)  a  c
x # mp  _a, b # LA . x=(b, a, a  b)
so that
TA [1, 2]#I(1 _ S _ K, 2 _ mp).
Below we use the following notation for TA and other theories we introduce:
TA (without parameters) is TA [<, <], |&A a is a # TA , and |&A[1, 2] a is
a # TA [1, 2].
TA formalizes arrow logic; to give a feel for it we show how one might prove (I).
We begin by proving some trivial metatheorems:
Lemma 3.
\a, b # LA . |&A a O |&A a  b O |&A b (MPA)
\a, b, c # LA . |&A (a  b)  (a  b  c)  a  c (SA)
\a, b # LA . |&A a  b  a (KA)
All of these follow directly from the definition of TA . We then have:
Theorem 4 (IA1). \a # LA . |&A a  a .
We prove this (on the machine) using the following steps:
1. |&A (a  b  a)  (a  (b  a)  a)  a  a SA
2. |&A a  b  a KA
3. |&A a  (b  a)  a KA
4. |&A (a  (b  a)  a)  a  a MPA 1,2
5. |&A a  a MPA 3,4
This metatheorem has been shown just for TA. However, if we examine the proof,
we see that it made use only of SA , KA , and MPA , and that these hold for
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arbitrary TA[1, 2], not just for the particular instance TA ; thus the result may be
parameterized, in an openended way, over all possible extensions to the axioms and
rules of TA .
Theorem 5 (IA2). \a # LA . |&A[1, 2] a  a .
This new metatheorem is parameterized with respect to the proof system: it states
that a  a holds in any extension of the Hilbert system represented by TA with new
axioms 1 and rules 2. But in fact we can generalize even further: the proof only
requires implication and sentential constants in our language, but there could be
other connectives. The most general form then is parameterized both with respect
to the language and the proof system
Theorem 6 (IA+). \a # LA[8, 9]. |&A[1, 2] a  a .
We then, of course, should also go on to prove similarly parameterized versions
of our other basic metatheorems, which we can do in the same way:
Theorem 7.
\a, b # LA[8, 9]. |&A[1, 2] a O |&A[1, 2] a  b O |&A[1, 2] b (MPA+)
\a, b, c # LA[8, 9]. |&A[1, 2] (a  b)  (a  b  c)  a  c (SA+)
\a, b # LA[8, 9]. |&A[1, 2] a  b  a (KA+)
\a, b, c # LA[8, 9]. |&A[1, 2] a  c O |&A[1, 2] a  b  c (ThinA+ )
These metatheorems are all fully open-ended: Due to the use of parameterization,
they can be used in any extension both of the language and of the proof system.
This makes them similar to the kinds of rules derivable using theorem provers, such
as Isabelle, in which theories are organized hierarchically and theorems proven in
subtheories are inherited in supertheories. In Section 5 we will classify these and
several other kinds of rules.
3.2. The Deduction Theorem
We cannot prove fully parameterized versions of all metatheorems. An example
of a metatheorem for Hilbert systems (in fact, as we have said, one of the most
important) that does not hold in all theory extensions is the deduction theorem.
But when this metatheorem does hold, its application allows trivial proofs of
theorems that are otherwise tricky to prove; e.g., IA1 , which we could reduce to
a |&A a, i.e., |&A[[a], <] a, which follows immediately.
How would we prove the deduction theorem? We first sketch the standard proof:
we show A  B by induction on the structure of possible derivations of B where A
is assumed as an axiom. There are two base cases:
v B is an axiom. Then B follows without A. Since we have, as an axiom,
B  A  B, by modus ponens we have A  B.
v B is A. Then we need to show A  A, which we can do, following the proof
of IA1 above.
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In the step case B follows by an application of modus ponens to C and C  B. By
the induction hypothesis we have A  C and A  C  B, and as an axiom we have
(A  C)  (A  C  B)  A  B. Thus by modus ponens twice we have A  B.
We can formalize the deduction theorem in a form where we can prove it using
the induction available in FS0 , as
\a, b # LA . |&A[[a], <] b O |&A[<, <] a  b .
This is the minimal, closed form of the theorem. An open-ended version would be
much more useful, but the theorem does not hold in all extensions; the class of
propositional modal logics, for example, provides a counterexample; i.e.,
c\1, 2. \a, b # LA . |&A[[a] _ 1, 2] b O |&A[1, 2] a  b .
Although a completely parameterized version of the deduction theorem is not
provable, if we look closely at the proof sketch, we can see that a limited form may
be available. We can see that we need
v  in the language LA , but there could be other connectives.
v the two axioms (S) and (K), but there could be other axioms.
v exactly the rule modus ponens, but no more; if there were other rules then
we would have more possibilities in the step case and arbitrary such possibilities are
not covered by our proof.
Thus full extensibility over the language is possible, but only restricted exten-
sibility, over the base, over the theory (i.e., no new rules); so the result we have
verified can be parameterized over 8, 9, and 1 to get
Theorem 8 (DT0). \a, b # LA[8, 9]. |&A[[a] _ 1, <] b O |&A[1, <] a  b .
This version can then be applied to infinitely many extensions of arrow logic. For
example, we can extend LA to LP by adding conjunction and extending TA to TP
by adding the three axioms given in (Conj). Since these are axioms and not rules,
we can directly apply DT0 to prove theorems in this extended language and proof
system, for instance to provide a second, simpler, proof that \a # LP . |&P a  a.
3.3. Rule Extensions of the Deduction Theorem
The above metatheorem, DT0 , has been generalized to apply to all extensions of
the language and to extensions with axioms of the proof system of LA . As it stands
though, we must prove a new version (when the theorem still holds) for each exten-
sion of the theory with new proof rules. We can do better than this.
It is possible to prove a more general theorem by formalizing sufficient condi-
tions for the addition of new rules. Returning to the above proof: what is the rela-
tionship between (S), (K), and modus ponens? (K) and (I)which follows from (K)
and (S)are needed for the two subcases of the base case. In the step case, (S)
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directly reflects the induction hypothesis corresponding to modus ponens, which, to
remind, is the rule
C C  B
B
and in the induction step each formula in this rule is prefixed by ‘‘A  ’’; i.e., from
A  C and A  C  B we must show A  B. If we internalize this (in Curried form)
as a formula in the logic itself we have
(A  C)  (A  C  B)  (A  B) ,
which is precisely the (S) axiom schema.
Now consider the more general case of a rule with two premises (this can be
generalized easily to finitely many assumptions). Such a rule is of the form
B C
D
.
A sufficient requirement for the deduction theorem is that in the step case we can
use the assumptions A  B and A  C to prove A  D.
We formalize this observation to get a more general form of DT0 . We do not,
however, insist that certain axioms like (S) be in the theory whenever certain rules
are; instead we directly formulate the provability requirement above. Thus we have
Theorem 9 (DT1). If we define L to be LA[8, 9], |& to be |&A[1, 2] and |&[a]
to be |&A[1 _ [a], 2] , then
\a, b # L. (\a, b, c, d # L. (d, b, c) # 2 O |&(a  b)
O |&(a  c) O |&(a  d )) O |&[a] b O |&a  b .
This metatheorem states general conditions that are sufficient for the deduction
theorem to hold. The following section shows, however, that even this is not the
most general version possible.
3.4. Modal Logic
In many logics that are simple extensions of arrow logic, the deduction theorem
fails, and, as is well known, modal logic is one of these. Prawitz, however, showed
that it is still possible in certain modal logics to reason under assumptions, as long
as we place conditions on the sort of assumptions we are allowed [15].
In this subsection we discuss a natural partial deduction theorem based upon the
following:
Theorem 10 (DT2). If we define L to be LA[8, 9], |& to be |&A[1, 2] and |&[a]
to be |&A[1 _ [a], 2] , then
\a, b # L. (\a, b, c, d # L. a # P O (d, b, c) # 2 O |&(a  b)
O |&(a  c) O |&(a  d )) O a # P
O |&[a] b O |&a  b .
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This generalizes DT1 , where the extra set P can be used to place restrictions on
the possible assumptions (setting P to the universal set provides DT1 as a special
case). Note that this result says nothing about modal logic; it is a parameterized
result that we have proved for arrow logic and arbitrary extensions.
Now consider modal logics. The modal logic K (not to be confused with the
axiom schema (K)) is formed by extending a propositional language to LM by
adding the unary modality g and extending a propositional proof system to TM by
adding the axiom (Norm) and the necessitation rule (Nec). Note that the necessita-
tion rule cannot be replaced by an axiom schema.
Definition 11 (LM). We define a new rule, boxrule, in the obvious way and
define LM[1, 2] to be LA[1, 2 _ boxrule].
Definition 12 (TM). We define the basic modal theory TM by first defining the
class of normal axiom schemata normax, and the necessitation rule (Nec), and
then defining TM [1, 2] to be TA[1 _ normax _ TA[<, <], 2 _ Nec].
Notice that, like in the usual formalizations of modal proof systems, all proposi-
tional tautologies are taken as axioms.
TM is the basic modal logic K. Our parameterized deduction theorem fails for
this logic. Let us return to our proof sketch above. We have a new step case for
(Nec). The formula B (=gB$) is the result of an application of (Nec) to B$. By the
induction hypothesis we have A  B$, and we want to prove A  gB$. Unfor-
tunately, this fails for modal logics in general. We can, however, prove a more spe-
cialized theorem in theories where an axiom called 4 or transitivity is available.
Definition 13 ( fourax). x # fourax  _a. x=ga  gga.
Then, if we define TMF [1, 2] to be TM [1 _ fourax, 2] we can prove
Lemma 14 (ClosedLem). If A is boxed (i.e., A#gA$), and B follows by (Nec)
from B$ (so we must also have B#gB$), then |&MF gA$  B$ implies |&MF gA$ 
gB$.
This theorem follows by:
1. |&MF gA$  B$
2. |&MF g(gA$  B$) Nec 1
3. |&MF g(gA$  B$)  ggA$  gB$ Normax
4. |&MF ggA$  gB$ MPA+ 2,3
5. |&MF (gA$  ggA$)  (ggA$  gB$)  (gA$  gB$) prop taut
6. |&MF gA$  ggA$ fourax
7. |&MF (ggA$  gB$)  gA$  gB$ MPA+ 5,6
8. |&MF gA$  gB$ MPA+ 7,4
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Since this result is parameterized for all axiom and language extensions, DT2
immediately gives us a partial deduction theorem for any modal logic with the
transitivity axiom.
Theorem 15 (DedThmMF).
\a, b # LM[8, 9]. (_a$ # LM[8, 9]. a=ga$)
O |&MF[[a] _ 1, <] b O |&MF[1, <] a  b .
Note that this proof uses results such as MPA+ , which we proved (and machine
checked) originally for arbitrary TA+.
This is not the full deduction theorem: we can use it only to construct proofs
under boxed assumptions; still it is general and holds for all modal logics containing
the transitivity axiom. In his book on natural deduction, Prawitz presents two
natural deduction systems, for S4 and S5, but no general results. Both our
metatheorem and Prawitz’ presentation place side conditions on assumptions, stat-
ing that they must be boxed; one difference is that Prawitz’ conditions are on the
treatment of g not  . Although it is not immediate, our metatheorem provides a
basis for giving a natural deduction presentation of modal logics like S4 that is
essentially equivalent to Prawitz; see [1, Section 4.4] for a more detailed discussion
of this.
4. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
4.1. Experience with FS0
We have presented an approach to machine checked metatheory based on induc-
tive definitions. Our practical experience using this approach to develop metatheory
has been very positive. Using our implementation of FS0 in Isabelle (which
provides more support than the minimal theory provided by Feferman) we were
able to verify formally the results documented here within a few days. Apart from
a few technical idiosyncrasies of FS0 , the proofs on the machine closely follow the
natural informal proofs we would produce on paper.
To give the reader a feel for this, we present a small part of our development.2
Consider the parameterized version of the deduction theorem proven for arrow
logic in Section 3.3. This was proven for a theory TA extended by an arbitrary set
of axioms 1 and rules 2 provided that for each rule an appropriate closure condi-
tion holds. In FS0 we begin by declaring the theory TA[1, 2] (i.e., TA) as we gave
it in Section 3.1.
comp("Sax", "(a&>b&>c)&>(a&>b)&>a&>c")
comp("Kax", "a&>b&>a")
comp("MP", "(b, a, a&>b)")
def("TA", ["A", "R"], "I(A Un Sax Un Kax, R Un MP)")
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2 Apart from some minor tidying, text in typewriter font comes directly from a checked proof
script.
We shall not explain all of the syntactic details, but the idea should be clear: the
above formalizes the two axioms S and K and the rule for modus ponens. The infix
function symbol Un stands for union, so TA is the theory TA[1, 2] where A and
R represent the parameters 1 and 2, respectively.
The statement of Theorem DT1 in Isabelle is then:
[| !! a b c d. ([|(d, b, c): R; a&>b: TA(A, R); a&>c: TA(A, R)|]
==> a&>d: TA(A, R));
b: TA(A Un [a], R) |]
==> a&>b: TA(A, R)
Note that !! is universal quantification and ==> is implication in the metalogic;
furthermore [| A1;...;An |] ==> A represents the nested implication A1
==>...=>An ==>A. This metatheorem states that we must show that a  b is a
theorem in the theory TA[A, R] (fourth line) when b is a theorem in the theory
TA[A _ [a], R] (third line) and the appropriate closure condition holds (first and
second line). This closure condition, as we have seen, is that when b cd is a rule in
R then from the provability of a  b and a  c it follows that a  d is provable.
The proof follows in five interactive steps, following the informal sketch. For
example, after induction we must show a step case consisting of:
[| a&>b: TA(A, R); a&>c: TA(A, R); (d, b, c): R Un MP |]
==> a&>d: TA(A, R)
We proceed by unrolling the definition of set union, Un, which gives us two goals,
depending on whether the rule b cd is an instance of R or modus ponens. This yields
two subgoals
1. [| a&>b: TA(A, R); a&>c: TA(A, R); (d, b, c): R |]
==> a&>d: TA(A, R)
2. [| a&>b: TA(A, R); a&>c: TA(A, R); (d, b, c): MP |]
==> a&>d: TA(A, R)
and the first is proved using the closure condition associated with R and the
second, as is standard, using the axioms S.
4.2. Other Metatheories Supporting Inductive Definitions
We have indicated how parameterized inductive definitions in FS0 support struc-
tured metatheoretic development. Our approach, based on parameterizing possible
extensions is also possible in other metatheories that support similar kinds of induc-
tive definitions. Possible alternative candidates include constructive type theories [3],
set-theory [14], or higher-order logic [6].
We have also carried out a development similar to the one sketched in this paper
using a theory of inductive definitions based on the KnasterTarski theorem in
Isabelle’s theory of higher-order logic [12]. The differences were minor.
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What follows is a snapshot from this development illustrating some of the close
similarities. We can declare in Isabelle the theory TA[1, 2] as an inductively
defined set TA parameterized by A and R.
Hilbert =
TA :: "[$a pl set, ($a pl*$a pl)=>$a pl]=>$a pl set"
inductive "TA A R"
intrs
A "p: A ==> p: TA A R"
R "[| a: TA A R; b: TA A R |] ==> R(a, b): TA A R"
K "a&>b&>a: TA A R"
S "(a&>b&>c)&>(a&>b)&>a&>c: TA A R"
MP "[| a&>b: TA A R; a: TA A R |] ==> b: TA A R"
The declaration declares the type of TA. It is a function that returns a set of
propositions (over some type $a) given two arguments; the first is a set of proposi-
tions (the additional axioms), and the second is a function from pairs of proposi-
tions to a proposition (the additional rule instances). Following this are the cases
of the inductive definition that explain how to generate members of the set TA A R.
In this context, the statement of the parameterized deduction theorem is as follows.
[| !!a b c. [| a&>b: TA A R; a&>c: TA A R |]
==> a ==> R(b, c): TA A R;
b: TA (A Un [a]) R |]
==> a&>b: TA A R
Although higher-order logic and its conservative extension with a theory of induc-
tively defined sets is very different from FS0 (which is a conservative extension of
primitive recursive arithmetic), this example indicates that the details of the for-
malization are similar. Moreover, so are the proofs themselves, since reasoning in
both cases is abstracted away from the underlying metatheory.
5. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1. Standard Metatheory and Hierarchical Structuring
We have shown that parameterized inductive definitions offer considerable power
and simplicity in organizing metatheories. Each metatheorem states the conditions
an extension has to satisfy for it to apply, so once proved, we need only check these
conditions before making use of it. Most metatheorems require only that certain
axioms and rules are available and therefore hold in all extensions with additional
axioms and rules. Others depend on certain things being absent (e.g., other rules, in
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the case of the deduction theorem); in such cases, we can prove more restricted
theorems that are still usable in appropriate extensions.
How does this kind of metatheory compare with what is possible in theorem
provers supporting hierarchical theories? We begin by reviewing the two standard
notions of proof rules. Our definitions are those of Troelstra [16, Sect. 1.11.1]
translated into our notation (T[1, 2] is a theory T extended with sets of axioms 1
and rules 2).
Fix a language of formulae. A rule is an n+1-ary relation over formulae
(F1 , ..., Fn , Fn+1) where the F1 , ..., Fn are the premises and Fn+1 the conclusion.
A rule is admissible for T iff
|&T[<, <] F1 O } } } O |&T[<, <] Fn O |&T[<, <] Fn+1 , (adm)
and derivable for T iff
\1. ( |&T[1, <] F1 O } } } O |&T[1, <] Fn O |&T[1, <] Fn+1) . (der)
Derivability implies admissibility, but not vice versa; e.g. ‘‘cut’’ for first-order logic
in the sequent calculus is the classic example of an admissible, but not derived, rule
(since it is no longer admissible if the presentation is extended to, e.g., Peano
arithmetic). It is easy to show that Troelstra’s definition of derivability is equivalent
to that used by Hindley and Seldin [8]; i.e., |&T[[F1 , ..., Fn], <] Fn+1 , and that if a rule
is derivable it holds in all extensions of T with new axioms and rules.
Our use of formal metatheory allows us to formalize both admissible and derived
rules, as well as other sorts not fitting the above schemata. For example, the
languages or proof systems for the Fi can be different, like in the various versions
of the deduction theorem that we have formalized; our deduction theorems are
neither derived nor admissible, since their statements involve different proof
systems.
The simple theory hierarchies of systems like Isabelle, which we discussed in the
introduction, allow the formal derivation of a subset of the derived rules of a
theory. For example, in order to prove a theorem in Isabelle, one has (naturally)
to specify the theory in which this is going to be done; then the proof can use any
axioms, rules, or formally derived rules of that theory. All theorems proved hold in
any extension with new axioms or rules. However, not all rules belonging to the
class of derived rules can be formally derived this way. In particular, it is not
possible to derive an instance of (der) which needs induction on the language of the
theory, even though such a theorem would hold in all extensions of the proof
system. On the other hand (because of this restriction) proven theorems hold not
only in extensions of the proof system, but in extensions of the language as well.
5.2. Other Approaches
Type theories support an approach to structuring theories (which can include
induction principles) by formalizing them as 7-types [9, 11]. For instance, these
types can be used to formalize the languages and proof systems of logics, and after
one can prove inclusions and the existence of other kinds of relations between types
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and their members. Examples of this approach, which is very powerful, are
provided by Basin and Constable [2]. However the user is obliged, with each new
theory declaration, to prove new metatheorems relating it to previously constructed
theories.
The IMPS prover also provides support for the formalization of individual ‘‘little
theories’’ and interpretations between them [4]. Theory interpretation allows us to
apply, for example, abstract theorems of group theory to a more concrete mathe-
matical structure like the real numbers, after showing that multiplication over non-
zero elements forms a group. In many respects, theory interpretation is more
general than the kind of metatheory we have explored, but, like with approaches
using 7-types, one must explicitly construct (perhaps with help from the system) an
appropriate interpretation mapping one theory into another.
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